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 ‘Treatment Not Trident’: Medical Activism, Health
Inequality and Anti-Militarism in 1980s Britain
Christoph Laucht*
Summary. In 1985, Britain’s chief group of medical anti-nuclear weapons activists, the Medical
Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (MCANW), launched its ‘Treatment, Not Trident’ (TNT) cam-
paign. TNT called on the Thatcher Government to cancel the acquisition of the Trident nuclear
weapon system and divert those funds to the National Health Service and foreign aid instead. Using
TNT, this article makes some more general observations about key aspects of the history, nature
and ideologies of medical activism in relation to anti-militarism and health inequality. Alongside a
conceptualisation of ‘medical activism’, it offers an examination of chief ways in which the strategic
mobilisation of health and welfare priorities, and a growing interest in developing nations enabled
MCANW to reach a larger audience. Moreover, higher levels of professionalisation, politicisation
and inclusivity contributed to TNT’s success, making it a crucial moment in the development of
both MCANW and medical activism in general.
Keywords: medical activism; health inequality; anti-militarism; Medical Campaign Against
Nuclear Weapons; Trident nuclear weapon system
Upon his arrival at the Conservative Party conference in Manchester in October 2015, the
Secretary of State for Health Jeremy Hunt faced loud protests over his plans to reform
the National Health Service (NHS), which represents both an integral component and
symbol of the British welfare state. One of the placards on display outside the conference
venue boasted one of the slogans of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)—
‘NHS Not Trident’.1 This motto linked the funding crisis of the NHS with the pledge of
the Cameron Government to renew the Trident nuclear weapon system, which com-
prised American-made submarine-launched Trident ballistic missiles (SLBMs) armed with
British-manufactured nuclear warheads and based on British-built nuclear submarines.2
But such criticism of the proportionality of spending on defence versus public health was
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hardly new, for it went to the heart of an anti-militarist argument that medical activists
such as the Prussian pathologist, politician and peace campaigner Rudolf Virchow had
promoted as early as the second half of the nineteenth century.3 While CND used a simi-
lar rhetoric in its original 1980s campaign against the Thatcher Government’s decision to
purchase Trident and compared, amongst other things, government expenditure on that
weapon system to ‘the cost of 500 general hospitals’, the Medical Campaign Against
Nuclear Weapons (MCANW) targeted the imbalance between the government’s over-
spending on nuclear arms and its simultaneous underfunding of the health services and
foreign aid in a separate ‘Treatment Not Trident’ (TNT) campaign.4 In TNT, which marked
MCANW’s first national campaign, Britain’s chief group of medical anti-nuclear weapons
activists called on the Thatcher Government to cancel the procurement of the Trident sys-
tem and re-allocate those funds to the NHS and foreign aid budgets instead.5
This article uses TNT to make some more general observations about key facets of the
history, nature and ideologies of medical activism in relation to anti-militarism and health
inequality in 1980s Britain and beyond.6 Alongside a conceptualisation of ‘medical activ-
ism’, it offers an examination of key aspects of this phenomenon. In particular, it explores
the strategic mobilisation of health and welfare priorities, and a growing interest in devel-
oping nations. Through the combination of health inequality with nuclear dis-
armament—one of MCANW’s original objectives—TNT addressed a matter that directly
affected many Britons, thus making the campaign relevant to a larger audience.
Similarly, a broader geographical focus on the so-called Third World spoke to contempo-
rary concerns past the nuclear weapons issue. What further boosted the campaign’s im-
pact was MCANW’s readiness to formulate more pronounced political statements in the
context of TNT than in previous declarations, the increasing professionalisation of its cam-
paigning methods and style and the intention to raise its level of inclusivity by recruiting
3Christian Jenssen, ‘“Die Aufru¨stung ist die Mikrobe
des Krieges . . .”: Rudolf Virchow (1821–1902), schil-
lernder “Apostel des Friedens und der Verso¨hnung”’,
in Thomas M. Ruprecht and Jenssen, eds, A¨skulap
oder Mars? A¨rzte gegen den Krieg (Bremen: Donat,
1991), 75–98. This article follows Cynthia Cockburn’s
definition of ‘anti-militarism’ as any opposition to ‘mil-
itary rule, high military expenditure or the imposition
of foreign [military] bases’ in Anti-Militarism: Political
and Gender Dynamics of Peace Movements
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 2.
4CND, Who Opposes Trident? (London: CND
Publications, n.d.), unpaginated, the British Library of
Political and Economic Science Archives, London
School of Economics, London, United Kingdom, CND
Papers, CND/2008/7/2/1.
5Nick Lewer, Physicians and the Peace Movement
(London: Cass, 1992), 80–2; MCANW, ‘Press
Information: 23rd September 1985, Background
Information on MCANW’, Medact Archive, Archive
and Manuscript Collection, Wellcome Library,
London, United Kingdom (hereafter SA/MED), SA/
MED/F/4/4. Note that TNT was also known as ‘Trident
or Health?’.
6Eleanor Davey, ‘Famine, Aid, and Ideology: The
Political Activism of Me´decins sans Frontie`res in the
1980s’, French Historical Studies, 2011, 34, 529–58;
Lewer, Physicians and the Peace Movement; Lisa
Rumiel, ‘Exposing the Cold War Legacy: The Activist
Work of Physicians for Social Responsibility and
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear
War, 1986 and 1992’, in Virginia Berridge and Martin
Gorsky, eds, Environment, Health, and History
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 224–43;
Ruprecht and Jenssen, eds, A¨skulap oder Mars?;
Cockburn, Anti-Militarism; Kevin Morgan, ‘Militarism
and Anti-Militarism: Socialists, Communists and
Conscription in France and Britain 1900–1940’, Past
and Present, 2009, 202, 207–44; Virginia Berridge,
ed., Inequalities and Health, spec. issue of
Contemporary British History, 2002, 16; Paul Farmer,
Infections and Inequalities: The Modern Plagues
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
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more health workers, especially nurses.7 By addressing these issues, this study brings
medical activism into conversation with the historiographies of non-governmental organ-
isations (NGOs), especially their evolution from single- into multi-issue campaigns during
the 1980s, the welfare state, Thatcherism and anti-nuclear weapons protests.8
Central to MCANW’s campaigning against nuclear weapons was a notion of ‘medical
activism’ that drew legitimisation from the occupational backgrounds of the group’s
members, in particular their commitment to specific professional codes of ethics and ex-
pertise. This dated back to 1980, when concerned medical professionals, at a time of ris-
ing tensions between the superpowers, launched MCANW as a group of medical and
health experts under the directorship of immunologist John Humphrey to examine the
anticipated medical consequences of nuclear war.9 The group’s reliance on ‘contributory
expertise’, or the highest level of know-how, about the medical effects of nuclear war
distinguished its work from public health activism such as the AIDS movement with its
heterogeneous lay supporter base that commonly relied on ‘interactional expertise’ and
lacked a more profound medical understanding of the subject matter.10 Yet, with its rela-
tively small membership base of about 3,500 and its fairly centralised organisational
structure, MCANW also shared key characteristics with public health groups and, as
Virginia Berridge and Alex Mold observe elsewhere, ‘drew strength from an image,
rather than a reality, of mass activism’.11 This self-fashioned contributory expert identity
also fostered a high degree of exclusivity amongst MCANW’s membership, with medical
professionals (63.4 per cent) outnumbering nurses and other health workers by far.12
And this was despite the fact that the Nursing Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons had
7MCANW, ‘Press Information: Press Release Sept 23rd
1985. Health Not Trident, Treatment Not Trident’, 2,
3, SA/MED/F/4/1.
8See Nick Crawson, Matthew Hilton and James
McKay, eds, NGOs in Contemporary Britain: Non-
State Actors in Society and Politics since 1945
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Matthew
Hilton et al., The Politics of Expertise: How NGOs
Shaped Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013), 218–20; Rudolf Klein, The New Politics
of the NHS: From Creation to Reinvention, 7th edn
(London: Radcliffe, 2013); Rodney Lowe, The Welfare
State in Britain since 1945, 3rd edn (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Pat Thane, The
Foundations of the Welfare State, 2nd edn (Harlow:
Longman, 1996); Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders,
eds, Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012); Charles Moore,
Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, 3 vols
(London: Allen Lane, 2013– ), I and II; Richard Vinen,
Thatcher’s Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of
the Thatcher Era (London: Pocket, 2009); Holger
Nehring, Politics of Security: British and West German
Protest Movements and the Early Cold War, 1945–
1970 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Mark
Phythian, ‘CND’s Cold War’, Contemporary British
History, 2001, 15, 133–56; Richard Taylor, Against
the Bomb: The British Peace Movement, 1958–1965
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
9MCANW, ‘Constitution’, July 1983, The Craig
Medical Peace Movements Archive, J. B. Priestley
Library Special Collections, University of Bradford,
Bradford, United Kingdom (hereafter CMPMA), 3/3;
Lewer, Physicians and the Peace Movement, 81–2.
10Harry Collins and Robert Evans, Rethinking Expertise
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 14;
Steven Epstein, AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of
Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1996), 8.
11MCANW, ‘Press Information: 23rd September 1985,
Background Information on MCANW’; Virginia
Berridge and Alex Mold, ‘Professionalisation, New
Social Movements and Voluntary Action in the 1960s
and 1970s’, in Matthew Hilton and James McKay,
eds, The Ages of Voluntarism: How We Got to the
Big Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),
114–34, 115–16.
12Lawrence S. Wittner, The Struggle against the Bomb,
3 vols (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1993–2003), III, 229; MCANW, ‘Breakdown of
MCANW Membership on a Total of 3369—14th
March 1986 (excluding Scotland)’, 24 March 1986,
SA/MED/C/2/2/4.
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merged with MCANW in 1982, and MCANW had subsequently set up a Nurses Working
Party.13
Apart from its contributory expert identity, MCANW’s reluctance to take political posi-
tions prior to TNT limited its impact. Like other British NGOs, MCANW campaigned from
a platform situated in-between pressure groups like the Abortion Law Reform
Association or Lesbians and Gays Support the Miners, on one side, and social movements
such as CND or political campaigning organisations like the Socialist Medical or Socialist
Health Associations respectively, on the other.14 Since many medical professionals sub-
scribed to an ideology of medicine being a ‘depoliticised profession’ and MCANW was,
in principle, open to all medical professionals and health workers regardless of their polit-
ical persuasion, the group was cautious not to establish close links with CND; for such a
move might have alienated members. Even though MCANW comprised many members
with centre-left political allegiances, the group remained, in the words of Steve Watkins,
‘a broad-based campaign of ordinary doctors concerned at the drift into nuclear war’
that lacked experience in medical politics.15
MCANW’s participation in transnational networks also influenced its agenda and
transformation into a multi-issue campaign. Alongside the Medical Association for the
Prevention of War (MAPW), MCANW became one of the two British affiliates of the
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)—the main transna-
tional hub of medical anti-nuclear weapons activists during the 1980s and winner of the
1985 Nobel Peace Prize.16 MCANW, like other IPPNW affiliates, adopted a prophylactic
medical approach to the nuclear arms race and, in conjunction with IPPNW, frequently is-
sued ‘medical prescriptions’ on nuclear-arms-related matters to reduce the risk of nuclear
war. While this preventative approach represented a general underlying ideological pillar
of MCANW’s medical activism, it was IPPNW’s diagnosis of militarism, in connection with
schizophrenia, as ‘a psychosocial disease’ and of militarists as ‘patient[s]’ or ‘[v]ictims of
militarism’ that informed TNT’s anti-militarist message.17 After all, Trident exemplified a
13‘MCANW Executive Meeting. Thursday 10 June
1982’, 2–3, SA/MED/C/2/1/1; Elaine Cundy,
‘MCANW Nurses Working Party’, n.d., CMPMA, 3/4.
14Stephen Brooke, ‘The Sphere of Sexual Politics: The
Abortion Law Reform Association, 1930s to 1960s’,
in Crawson, Hilton and McKay, eds, NGOs in
Contemporary Britain, 77–94; Diarmaid Kelliher,
‘Solidarity and Sexuality: Lesbians and Gays Support
the Miners 1984–5’, History Workshop Journal,
2014, 77, 240–62; Christopher Moores, ‘The
Progressive Professionals: The National Council for
Civil Liberties and the Politics of Activism in the
1960s’, Twentieth Century British History, 2009, 20,
538–60, 539; John Stewart, ‘The Battle for Health’: A
Political History of the Socialist Medical Association,
1930–1951 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); Steve
Watkins, Medicine and Labour: The Politics of a
Profession (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1987),
61–5.
15‘MCANW National Council Meeting. Sunday 25
October 1981’, 4, SA/MED/C/1/1/1; ‘MCANW
Executive Meeting. Thursday 10 June 1982’, 2; ‘No.
8. Minutes. Executive Committee Meeting, Thursday
2nd June 1983’, 2, all in SA/MED/C/2/1/1; Watkins,
Medicine and Labour, 20–1, 69, 183.
16Alex Poteliakoff and Patricia Craig, ‘Four Decades of
the Medical Association for Prevention of War’,
Medicine and War, 1991, 7, 173–84, 176;
‘International Physicians for the Prevention of
Nuclear War’, The Lancet, 1985, 326, 1289.
17Bernard Lown and John O. Pastore, ‘A Medical
Prescription for Survival’, The Lancet, 1985, 326,
1285–6; Barry S. Levy and Victor W. Sidel, ‘War and
Public Health: An Overview’, in Levy and Sidel, eds,
War and Public Health, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 3–20, 15–19; Lewer,
Physicians and the Peace Movement, 45–8; N. Arthur
Coulter, ‘Militarism: A Psychosocial Disease’,
Medicine and War, 1992, 8, 7–17, 12, 14.
‘Militarism’ is defined here, according to Martin
Shaw, as ‘the penetration of social relations in gen-
eral by military relations [orig. emphasis]’ in ‘Twenty-
First Century Militarism: A Historical-Sociological
Framework’, in Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby, eds,
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particularly powerful, technology-driven form of what David Edgerton terms ‘liberal mili-
tarism’ within Britain’s ‘warfare state’.18 In this, MCANW’s and IPPNW’s diagnosis ech-
oed views expressed by psychiatrists and the Medical Peace Campaign as well as the
Czechoslovakian paediatrician Emil Flusser in his pioneering book Krieg als Krankheit
(War as Illness) during the 1930s.19
If international issues framed many of MCANW’s aims and objectives, the group oper-
ated simultaneously within a particular national context and addressed genuinely British
issues. Unlike other Western European nations such as West Germany or Belgium, Britain
possessed an independent nuclear deterrent. At the same time, TNT addressed problems
that were peculiar to the British health services. Consequently, MCANW’s anti-nuclear
weapons activism developed dynamics and trajectories that differed from IPPNW affili-
ates in other countries.
The present study progresses in two stages. Its main section examines the evolution of
MCANW and its medical activism in TNT. Particular emphasis is placed on the group’s
programmatic expansion beyond a single-issue, anti-nuclear weapons campaign through
the combination of MCANW’s traditional campaigning focus on nuclear disarmament
with questions of health inequality and global development as well as its growing politici-
sation, professionalisation of its campaigning methods and inclusive approach towards
nurses and other health workers. A second section then explores the ways in which TNT
inspired subsequent MCANW campaigns, demonstrating the ongoing diversification of
the group’s agenda. Throughout, this article investigates MCANW’s anti-nuclear weap-
ons activism within both the synchronic and diachronic contexts of medical and peace
campaigning as well as NGO work.
‘Treatment Not Trident’, 1985–86
MCANW officially launched TNT with a press conference in the House of Commons on
23 September 1985. Hosted by the shadow Minister for Health Frank Dobson (Labour),
the event featured such illustrious speakers as paediatrician Helen Caldicott, a founding
member of MCANW and former president of its American sister organisation Physicians
for Social Responsibility, and Sir Douglas Black, who had previously served as president of
both the Royal College of Physicians and the British Medical Association (BMA) as well as
Chief Scientist at the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS).20 Additional
events took place in Aberdeen, Birmingham and Sheffield, with Caldicott delivering fur-
ther talks in Edinburgh and Glasgow.21 To lend TNT authority, MCANW secured promi-
nent support from biophysicist Maurice Wilkins, medical physicists Jack Boag and Joseph
Militarism and International Relations: Political
Economy, Security, Theory (London: Routledge,
2013), 19–32, 20.
18David Edgerton, ‘Liberal Militarism and the British
State’, New Left Review, 1991, 185, 138–69, 164–6;
David Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920–1970
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
19G. H. Adam et al., ‘The War Mentality: An Address
to Statesmen’, The Lancet, 1935, 226, 907; Craig
and Jenssen, ‘Zwischen Utopie, hilfloser Analyse und
Kriegsvorbereitung’, 310–13; Lewer, Physicians and
the Peace Movement, 52–7; Peter van den Dungen,
‘Dr. Emil Flusser: Forgotten Precursor of the Medical
Peace Movement’, Medicine, Conflict and Survival,
1996, 12, 90–106, 90, 91, 94.
20‘MCANW Strategy Group: First Report to National
Council (September 14th 1985)’, 1, CMPMA, 3/13;
MCANW, ‘Press Information: Sep 24.85, Report on
Launch of Campaign Treatment Not Trident’, SA/
MED/F/4/4. Black faced some criticism over his sup-
port of TNT, ‘Black’s Accident Spotting’, Guardian,
24 September 1985, 32.
21MCANW, ‘Press Information: “Treatment Not
Trident.” Campaign Activities’, n.d., SA/MED/F/4/1.
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Rotblat, dermatologist Sam Shuster, haematologist Allan Jacobs, Labour MP Robin Cook
and the leader of the Liberal Party David Steel. The fact that Brigadier Michael Harbottle
and Air Commodore Alastair Mackie, two ‘unorthodox defencists’, as Martin Ceadel calls
such military figures who opposed Trident in favour of higher expenditure on conven-
tional military forces, also backed the campaign further strengthened TNT’s argument.22
MCANW placed the imbalance between excessive government expenditure on a nu-
clear weapon system and chronic underfunding of the health services and foreign aid at
the centre of TNT. It proposed a pragmatic solution: the Thatcher Government should
scrap the Trident programme and re-invest the funds thus saved into the NHS and aid for
developing nations. In this, MCANW combined nuclear disarmament, one of its tradi-
tional key objectives, with a new focus on health inequality in Britain and developing
nations. This act of unilateral British nuclear disarmament represented, in MCANW’s offi-
cial view, the first stage in a process aimed at achieving multilateral nuclear disarmament
(particularly a comprehensive nuclear test ban) and ultimately a global ‘freeze’ on nuclear
arms development and manufacture.23
By making unilateral British nuclear disarmament part of a broader multilateralist argu-
ment, MCANW sought to defuse the highly politicised and unpopular issue of unilateral-
ism. After all, the Labour Party, which pledged to abolish the British nuclear deterrent,
suffered a humiliating defeat in the 1983 general election.24 While unilateral nuclear dis-
armament was never a popular proposition in Britain, growing public doubt over the
high expenditure on the Trident system appeared to provide MCANW with an opportu-
nity to rally public support behind TNT. By December 1984, the Thatcher Government
feared that the opposition to Trident by the Labour Party and the Social Democratic
Party–Liberal Alliance might play into the hands of CND.25 MCANW exploited this mood
by citing another ‘unorthodox defencist’, Field Marshal Lord Carver, who referred to
Trident as ‘a waste of money’, in campaigning materials.26
MCANW’s line on nuclear disarmament closely followed policy decisions by IPPNW
and the BMA, the chief representative body and union of British medical professionals.27
22MCANW, ‘Press Information: Treatment Not
Trident’, n.d., attached to letter, Bernadette Hayes to
MCANW branch co-ordinators, 9 October 1985,
Archive of the Medical Association for the Prevention
of War, J. B. Priestley Library Special Collections,
University of Bradford, Bradford, United Kingdom
(hereafter MAPW Archive), M. 2; Martin Ceadel,
Thinking about Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1987), 90–1.
23MCANW, Trident: A Tragedy for the Health Services
(n.p.: MCANW, 1985), 2, 7–9, SA/MED/F/4/4;
MCANW, ‘Press Information: 23rd September 1985,
Background Information on MCANW’; Will Howard,
‘Memorandum: Key Points in Developing the Freeze
Dialogue’, 13 April 1985, SA/MED/J/1/6; Bradford
Martin, The Other Eighties: A Secret History of
America in the Age of Reagan (New York: Hill and
Wang, 2011), 3–24.
24Len Scott, ‘Labour and the Bomb: The First 80 Years’,
International Affairs, 2006, 82, 685–700, 691;
Richard Taylor, ‘The Labour Party and CND’, in
Richard Taylor and Nigel Young, eds, Campaigns for
Peace: British Peace Movements in the Twentieth
Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1987), 100–30, 120–3.
25Official Group on Nuclear Weapons and Public
Opinion, ‘An Assessment of the Public Nuclear
Debate, D/DS17/2/16/15’, 18 December 1984, 8, the
National Archives, Kew, Richmond, UK (hereafter
TNA), FCO 46/4188.
26Carver, cited in MCANW, Trident or Health? (London
and Cambridge: MCANW, [1985]),1, SA/MED/F/4/2.
27See, for example, ‘MCANW: Policy Making
Conference, 13 & 14 November 1982’; MCANW,
‘Resolutions from the Policy Conference held in
London on November 13th/14th, 1982’, 23
November 1982, 2, attached to letter, P. G. Mann to
B. A. Staines, 14 December 1982, all in CMPMA, 3/
2; MCANW, ‘Petition to Her Majesty’s Government
to Reverse the Decision to Introduce the Trident
Weapon System’, 24 September 1984, MAPW
Archive, M. 2; ‘MCANW Chair Leads Deputation to
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Although MCANW decided in 1983, in line with a recent BMA resolution, not to pro-
mote unilateral nuclear disarmament because a unilateralist line might alienate some
members, the group subsequently connected unilateral and multilateral nuclear disarma-
ment through its simultaneous support of an IPPNW motion that called on world govern-
ments to instate a multilateral ‘freeze’ on the manufacture, siting and testing of nuclear
arms as a first step towards the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. As part of
this multilateral ‘freeze’, MCANW urged the Thatcher Government to abandon its plans
to procure the Trident system and demanded that American cruise missiles were not
deployed to Britain.28 The decision by the BMA’s annual representative meeting in July
1984 to endorse multilateral global disarmament—both nuclear and conventional—in-
cluding a call on world governments to re-allocate defence funds to health care pro-
grammes at home and in developing nations appeared to legitimise both MCANW’s
evolution into a multi-issue campaign and TNT’s anti-militarist argument further.29
The campaign poster visualised TNT’s anti-militarist message about health inequality,
depicting a Trident nuclear submarine (with a trident mounted on its bow) and a pie
chart that symbolised the NHS budget being torn apart in three areas (medical research,
new hospitals and kidney machines) by the submarine’s vicious-looking trident (Figure 1).
Funds set free through a cancellation of the Trident purchase, argued MCANW, could be
used to invest in these chronically underfunded, yet crucially important areas of the
health care sector. By comparison with the multi-billion expenditure on the new nuclear
weapon system, the Thatcher Government cut the budget for medical research by £5
million annually—a comparatively small yet, from MCANW’s point of view, vital sum.
Similarly, MCANW assessed the cost of crucially needed kidney machines to be in the re-
gion of £50 million per year and the cost for one new hospital to be £22 million. Through
these comparisons MCANW sought to demonstrate the levels of improvement that a
cancellation and re-allocation of the Trident budget to the NHS might in theory support.
Two publications accompanied TNT, outlining its main aims and arguments. The first
one was a short pamphlet entitled Trident or Health? It offered a brief technical overview
of the Trident system and emphasised the technological dependence of its American-
made missiles on the United States military and NATO policy.30 The second publication
took the form of a more substantial booklet, entitled A Tragedy for the Health Services.
Drafted by the TNT Working Group, which MCANW set up for this purpose, the national
office distributed the report. Unlike the shorter TNT pamphlet, it contained references
throughout, thus suggesting to readers a high degree of academic inter-subjectivity and
medical expertise.31 In addition, MCANW intended to table an early day motion, a
Number 10’, MCANW National Newsletter, 1985,
13, 7, CMPMA, 3/12.
28‘Annual General Meeting. MCANW. Minutes: AGM
25th June 1983’, in ‘Interim Report: Summer 1983’,
6–7, SA/MED/C/1/1/1. Moore, Margaret Thatcher, II,
50; David Josephs, ‘1983 to 1988—The BMA and
the Nuclear Issue’, Medicine and War, 1989, 5, 139–
40; Watkins, Medicine and Labour, 183–8.
29‘From the ARM: Money, Manpower, and
Management’, British Medical Journal, 1984, 289,
199–203; David Hencke, ‘BMA Says Arms Cash Cuts
Could Pay for Health Care’, Guardian, 6 July 1984, 3;
Nicholas Timmins, ‘British Medical Association’, The
Times, 6 July 1984, 3; Joanna Francis, ‘Doctors Vote
for Arms Cut’, Sanity, 1984, 8, 6; Watkins, Medicine
and Labour, 150.
30MCANW, Trident or Health?,1.
31MCANW, ‘Press Information: 23rd September 1985,
Background Information on MCANW’; MCANW,
Trident: A Tragedy for the Health Services, 2, 7–9.
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Figure 1: ‘Treatment Not Trident’ campaign poster. Item from the Medact Archive. Wellcome Images ref-
erence: L0075381.
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common approach taken by NGOs, on government expenditure on health versus Trident
in the House of Commons.32
TNT, thus, marked a decisive moment in MCANW’s transformation process from a sin-
gle- into a multi-issue campaign: although Trident ‘surfaced’ on MCANW’s agenda from
November 1982, it did not take centre stage in the group’s campaigning until December
1984, when MCANW’s Executive Committee acknowledged the need for the group’s
programmatic diversification. In light of declining public and media interest in MCANW’s
traditional focus on the medical effects of nuclear war, the board decided that the imbal-
ance in government spending on Trident and the NHS, in particular the resultant health
inequality, should become its central campaigning focus.33 The timing of the Executive
Committee’s decision coincided with the final period of the Second Cold War when ten-
sions between the superpowers and public fears of nuclear war abated.34
This programmatic shift mirrored developments within the wider NGO sector and be-
yond the anti-nuclear weapons movement. After the Second World War, the increasing
secularisation and professionalisation of British society replaced religious beliefs with pro-
fessional expertise and codes of ethics as the underlying principles of NGO work. For
many NGOs, this trend initially translated into an orientation as single-issue campaigns,
based on their members’ professional expertise and ethos.35 During the nuclear test ban
debate of the 1950s, for example, atomic scientists played a crucial part in informing the
public and political decision makers about the human health and environmental effects
of nuclear weapons.36 By the mid-1980s, however, MCANW, like OXFAM and other
NGOs, deemed it vital to adopt a multi-issue agenda to ensure its continued relevance
and, ultimately, its existence.37
MCANW’s transformation into a multi-issue campaign was entwined with its growing
readiness to take political positions. ‘Patients will be given a little preventive medicine’, al-
luded MCANW chairperson Stephen Farrow at the TNT press conference to one key tar-
get group for TNT and justified its political message—a chief characteristic of that
campaign. National newspapers and medical journals also registered TNT’s comparatively
high degree of politicisation. And TNT marked, according to the Guardian’s medical cor-
respondent Andrew Veitch, ‘the first time that a large chunk of the medical profession in
Britain ha[d] taken political action on nuclear weapons’.38
32MCANW, ‘Press Information: Press Release Sept 23rd
1985. Health Not Trident, Treatment Not Trident’;
Hilton et al., The Politics of Expertise, 127–31.
According to the Parliamentary Archives, an early
day motion was neither tabled during the 1985–86
nor the early 1986–87 sessions; Richard Ward to au-
thor, email, 15 April 2016.
33‘MCANW Executive Meeting. Thursday 10 June
1982’, 2; ‘Minutes No. 20. MCANW Executive
Committee Meeting held on Saturday 15th
December 1984’, 2, all in SA/MED/C/2/1/1; ‘Minutes
No. 12. MCANW National Council Meeting held at
Friends House, Euston Road, London, on Saturday,
16th March 1985’, 2, SA/MED/C/1/1/1.
34Becker-Schaum et al., ‘Introduction: The Nuclear
Crisis, NATO’s Double-Track Decision, and the Peace
Movement of the 1980s’ in Becker-Schaum et al.,
eds, The Nuclear Crisis: The Arms Race, Cold War
Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of
the 1980s, New York: Berghahn Books, 2016, 1–36,
23–25.
35Hilton et al., The Politics of Expertise, 62–3, 228.
36Christoph Laucht, ‘Scientists, the Public, the State,
and the Debate over the Environmental and Human
Health Effects of Nuclear Testing in Britain, 1950–
1958’, Historical Journal, 2016, 59, 221–51.
37Hilton et al., The Politics of Expertise, 218–20.
38Black and Farrow cited in Andrew Veitch, ‘Doctors
Prescribe Cure for Trident Spending’, Guardian, 24
September 1985, 3; ‘MCANW: Expenditure on
Armaments and on Health Care’, The Lancet, 1985,
326, 735; Su Maddock, ‘Treatment Not Trident’,
MCANW National Newsletter, 1985, 15, 1–2, 2,
CMPMA, 3/12; MCANW, ‘Press Information: 23rd
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This politicised tone found expression in TNT’s anti-militarist rhetoric, especially com-
parisons revolving around the cost of the nuclear weapon system. An MCANW press
communique´ equated Trident’s estimated cost of £11 billion to the sum of ‘£30,000 per
day for the next thousand years’.39 MCANW relied on existing arguments against Trident
that had emerged in the context of the public debate over its cost and strategic relevance
around the time of the first Trident deal.40 When the Thatcher Government was forced
to revise its order of Trident missiles from the C-4 to the much more powerful D-5 model
because of decisions taken by the incoming Reagan Administration in the United States,
resistance against that weapon system grew from both within and outside the
Conservative Party.41
Given the great uncertainty about the definitive cost of Trident, MCANW put different
price tags on that weapon system at different stages of TNT, ranging from about £9 to
£11 billion.42 This appeared to be in line with official and unofficial estimates of the cost
of procuring the D-5 model that varied between some £7.5 billion and £33.1 billion for
the period from 1981 to 1992, depending on a complex set of factors such as the ex-
change rate between the British pound sterling and the United States dollar or the cost
of refitting the missiles for their British-designed carrier submarines.43
To back up its anti-militarist line, TNT provided statistical evidence of disparities in gov-
ernment funding for defence and health care. Trident: A Tragedy for the Health Services
used data collected by the National Association of Health Authorities that showed a rise
in expenditure on the NHS by 0.59 per cent in real terms in the fiscal years from 1978–79
to 1983–84, while the defence budget had grown by about 3.91 per cent per annum
during the same period. Internationally, MCANW argued, Britain, which spent 5.4 per
cent of its gross national product on the health services in 1984, trailed behind other
Western nations, including Sweden (10 per cent), the United States (9.5 per cent), West
Germany (8 per cent) and France (6 per cent).44 This international comparison was mis-
leading though, as it did not factor in the cost effectiveness of individual health care sys-
tems, especially the American one that had just experienced a drive towards
commercialisation and seen the rise of a ‘new medical-industrial complex’ at the expense
of affordable patient services.45
September 1985, Background Information on
MCANW’; and press clippings, all in SA/MED/F/4/4.
39MCANW, ‘Press Information: Sep 24.85, Report on
Launch of Campaign Treatment Not Trident’.
40‘Trident: £7,260 Million Worth of Death’, Sanity,
1979, 6, 9; ‘How Much Will Trident Cost?’, The
Times, 16 July 1980, 17; Judith Reppy and Harry
Dean, ‘Britain Buys the Trident’, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, 1980, 36, 26–31; ‘Defence
Debate’, News at Ten (ITV Late Evening News), 7 July
1981; Lawrence Freedman, ‘Britain: The First Ex-
Nuclear Power?’, International Security, 1981, 6,
80–-104.
41John Baylis and Kristan Stoddart, The British Nuclear
Experience: The Role of Beliefs, Culture, and Identity
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 151–69;
Andrew Dorman, ‘John Nott and the Royal Navy: The
1981 Defence Review Revisited’, Contemporary
British History, 2001, 15, 98–120, 118; Moore,
Margaret Thatcher, I, 571–3; ‘Counting the
Warheads’, Guardian, 6 October 1981, 12.
42MCANW, Trident: A Tragedy for the Health Services,
7; MCANW, ‘Press Information: Sep 24.85’; ‘Trident
Costs’, MCANW National Newsletter, 1985, 13, 7,
CMPMA, 3/12.
43Keith Hartley, ‘The Economics of UK Nuclear
Weapons Policy’, International Affairs, 2006, 82,
675–-84, 678–9; Mort, Building the Trident Network,
187 n 5; Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street
Years (London: Harper, 1993), 244, 248; Moore,
Margaret Thatcher, I, 572–3.
44MCANW, Trident: A Tragedy for the Health
Services, 1.
45Arnold S. Relman, ‘The New Medical-Industrial
Complex’, New England Journal of Medicine, 1980,
303, 963–70.
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Besides relying on budgetary data, MCANW established a correlation between infant
mortality rates and the prioritisation of government spending on defence over health
care to accentuate the detrimental impact that such disproportionate government spend-
ing on the military could have on health care provision. Since infant mortality represented
a chief marker of health inequity, this causal link offered a powerful evidence-based tool
to support MCANW’s anti-militarist argument. TNT materials cited two historical exam-
ples that had previously been used at IPPNW’s 1984 international congress as evidence
of such a direct connection. In the United States, the group claimed, an increase in the
defence budget led to welfare cuts between 1980 and 1982. As a result, the child mor-
tality rate remained at a relatively high level for an industrialised nation. By contrast, in-
fant mortality rates in Costa Rica dropped sharply after the country had stood down its
military forces in 1949, thus setting a positive example for MCANW’s anti-militarist line in
TNT. Although perinatal mortality rates in Britain had been in decline for years, the group
noted with concern that those for infant mortality remained at a relatively high level by
comparison with other Western countries such as Sweden, Japan, France or Spain. And,
what is more, MCANW even took into account socio-demographic factors: ‘For the
death of every one male infant born to professional parents, almost two will die among
children of skilled manual workers and three among the children of unskilled manual
workers.’46
Two studies informed TNT’s line of argumentation on the causal relationship between
militarism, health inequality and infant mortality. The first one was a report by two
American physicians, Steffie Woolhandler and David U. Himmelstein, on the link between
infant mortality, health inequality and military expenditure. It was based on data from
140 nations and concluded ‘that militarism [wa]s deleterious to health even in the ab-
sence of overt hostilities’ and would result in ‘two million infant deaths each year’.47 The
second one was the so-called Black Report on health inequality in Britain. Its publication
in August 1980 signified a key moment for re-focusing the attention of medical profes-
sionals and health workers on health inequality as a major issue: while it represented a
chief concern in the aftermath of the Boer War and during the 1930s global economic
crisis, health inequality only re-surfaced as a key matter for medical professionals and
health workers in the 1970s.48
Officially called Inequalities in Health, the Black Report was the product of a Working
Group on Inequalities in Health in the DHSS under the directorship of Sir Douglas Black. It
established a correlation between poor health and low socioeconomic status that
46‘IPPNW: 4th Congress Meets in Helsinki’, The Lancet,
1984, 323, 1363–4, 1363; MCANW, Trident: A
Tragedy for the Health Services, 1, 6.
47Steffie Woolhandler and David U. Himmelstein,
‘Militarism and Mortality: An International Analysis of
Arms Spending and Infant Death Rates’, The Lancet,
1985, 325, 1375–8; Peter H. Whincup, letter to the
editor, The Lancet, 1985, 326, 46; Douglas
Holdstock, ‘Health and the Arms Race’, Medicine
and War, 1985, 1, 83–5. For a contemporary critique
of this correlation, see Petr Skrabanek, letter to the
editor, The Lancet, 1985, 326, 46.
48Charles Webster, ‘Investigating Inequalities in Health
before Black’, Contemporary British History, 2002,
16, 81–104; Peter Townsend and Nick Davidson,
eds, Inequalities in Health: The Black Report
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982); Mel Bartley,
Health Inequality: An Introduction to Theories,
Concepts and Methods (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2004), 1; MCANW, Trident: A Tragedy for the Health
Services, 6; MCANW, Trident or Health? Treatment
Not Trident Campaign Update. 23 September 1986
(London: MCANW, 1986), 4, SA/MED/F/4/6.
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supposedly affected members of low-income groups throughout their lives. Its authors
attributed this link to causes outside the remit of the NHS such as education, income or
unemployment and argued for a radical overhaul of health policy and the NHS as well as
providing more aid to lower-income groups.49 With these demands, the Black Report
and TNT added their voices to concerns that had been expressed by medical professionals
since the time of the public health movement in Victorian Britain.50
The ignorance and indifference that the Thatcher Government displayed towards
Inequalities in Health caused consternation and anger amongst medical professionals, in-
cluding Black’s team and MCANW. Trident: A Tragedy for the Health Service cited a
statement by the Secretary of State for Health Patrick Jenkin, in which the latter dis-
missed calls by Black’s team for ‘additional expenditure’ in the region ‘upwards of £11
billion a year’, the equivalent to the estimated cost of the Trident system, as ‘quite unreal-
istic in present or any foreseeable economic circumstances’, as proof of the Thatcher
Government’s prioritisation of Britain’s nuclear deterrent over public health care.51 What
further added to this impression was the way in which the government handled the mis-
sive by comparison with its open endorsement of the purchase of the Trident system.
Contrary to established practice, the DHSS neither issued a press release nor held a press
conference, and neither Her Majesty’s Stationary Office nor the DHSS printed it. Instead,
the DHSS distributed photocopies of the report to select journalists on the Friday before
the 1980 August Bank Holiday weekend.52 By contrast, the government openly pro-
moted the decision to acquire Trident missiles through a reprinted exchange of letters be-
tween the Thatcher Government and the Carter Administration on the first Trident deal
in The Times.53
If the budgetary prioritisation of nuclear armaments over public health care put the
health services in a financially difficult position, the simultaneous ‘“Thatcherization” of
the NHS’ (Martin Gorsky) placed them under even greater pressure, thereby creating an-
other major motivation behind TNT. Apart from the comparatively low growth rate of
real expenditure on the health services (the lowest in about 30 years), the increasing
bureaucratisation, a higher level of engagement with the private sector, the introduction
of rigorous managerialism and the appointment of an NHS chief executive in the wake of
the 1983 Griffiths Management Inquiry worried many medical professionals and health
49Townsend and Davidson, eds, Inequalities in Health;
Peter Townsend, Margaret Whitehead and Nick
Davidson, ‘Introduction to Inequalities in Health,
1992 Edition’, in Douglas Black et al., Inequalities in
Health: The Black Report and The Health Divide
(London: Penguin, 1992), 1–27, 2–3.
50Sally Macintyre, ‘The Black Report and Beyond: What
Are the Issues?’, Social Science and Medicine, 1996,
44, 723–45, 723; Christopher Hamlin, Public Health
and Social Justice in the Age of Chadwick: Britain,
1800–1854 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998).
51Patrick Jenkin, ‘Foreword’, in Townsend and
Davidson, eds, Inequalities in Health, unpaginated;
Townsend, Whitehead and Davidson, ‘Introduction
to Inequalities in Health, 1992 Edition’, 5; MCANW,
Trident: A Tragedy for the Health Services, 6;
Minerva, ‘Views’, British Medical Journal, 1980, 281,
690; ‘Inequalities in Health’, British Medical Journal,
1980, 281, 691; ‘Equalities and Inequalities in
Health’, British Medical Journal, 1980, 281, 762–3;
‘An Endangered Species’, British Medical Journal,
1980, 281, 1662–3. The methodologies used in the
Black Report were not undisputed: ‘Inequalities in
Health’, The Lancet, 1980, 316, 513.
52Working Group on Inequalities in Health, ‘Preface’,
in Townsend and Davidson, eds, Inequalities in
Health, unpaginated; Rodney Deitch, ‘Unwanted
Legacy from Jenkin’s Predecessor’, The Lancet, 1980,
316, 545.
53‘Exchange of Letters’, The Times, 16 July 1980, 6.
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workers.54 While the ‘welfare state did in fact achieve substantial reductions in absolute
(but not relative) inequalities in overall health and income’ between 1945 and 1980, as
Simon Szreter argues, it eventually became a victim of its own success. And its accom-
plishments in creating greater social security and affluence, particularly amongst mem-
bers of the working classes, ironically prepared the ground for promoting the Thatcherite
ideology of ‘“opting out” of the expensive measures of collective state provision’.55
Alongside reforms within the NHS, the perceived state of crisis that the health services
faced at the time also made the protection of the welfare state, from MCANW’s perspec-
tive, a highly relevant campaigning item.56 In TNT, MCANW thus offered a diagnosis of
the state of the NHS. The group set out to debunk claims by Norman Fowler, Jenkin’s
successor as Secretary of State for Social Services, that government expenditure on the
NHS had increased by 17 per cent in the period from 1978 to 1984 on the grounds of
three ‘complicating factors’ that Fowler had failed to take into account. Since price
increases for services and goods continuously floated above the inflation rate, the group
argued that this increase constituted in fact only 7 per cent in real terms. The second fac-
tor concerned the fixed nature of the overall budget for the NHS, with a rise in funding in
one area of the health services necessitating cutbacks in another. To illustrate this,
MCANW pointed to recent, additional investment in the health services in northern
England that prompted in turn budget cuts and hospital closures in the London area.
Finally, the group argued that continuing technological and demographic developments
alone required an increase in the NHS budget by 1.5 per cent per annum for the health
service to be able to operate at a steady level.57
Besides general funding, TNT identified several areas where health care provision had
suffered severely over the past few years, particularly a net reduction in the number of
hospital beds by about 12,900 between 1980 and 1983. Here, MCANW cited a study by
the Radical Statistics Group, an activist group of statisticians, on health inequality. During
the winter of 1984–85, these cuts in bed numbers caused a crisis in London, preventing
many general practitioners from admitting patients to hospitals and resulting in many fa-
talities. Another area concerned staffing in the NHS. In spite of an increase in the number
of nurses, the group argued that simultaneous cuts in numbers of auxiliary nursing staff
and a rise in workloads had in fact eliminated any growth in staff numbers. What further
hampered improvement in the quality of public health care, in MCANW’s view, was the
Thatcher Government’s refusal to create better consultant–junior doctor ratios and ca-
reer opportunities for junior staff. If these issues were grave, the report also flagged up
waiting lists for out-patient and non-urgent hospital treatments as chief indicators of the
54John Appleby, ‘Government Funding of the UK
National Health Service: What Does the Historical
Record Reveal?’, Journal of Health Services Research
and Policy, 1999, 4, 79–89, 79, 83; Martin Gorsky,
‘The British National Health Service 1948–2008: A
Review of the Historiography’, Social History of
Medicine, 2008, 21, 437–60, 445–6; Ben Jackson
and Robert Saunders, ‘Introduction: Varieties of
Thatcherism’, in Jackson and Saunders, eds, Making
Thatcher’s Britain, 1–21, 15; Lowe, The Welfare State
in Britain since 1945, 340–75; Nicholas Timmins, The
Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State, rev.
edn (London: HarperCollins, 2001), 369–494.
55Simon Szreter, Health and Wealth: Studies in History
and Policy (Rochester: University of Rochester Press,
2005), 14–15.
56Stephen Brooke, ‘Living in “New Times”:
Historicizing 1980s Britain’, History Compass, 2014,
12, 20–32, 27.
57MCANW, Trident: A Tragedy for the Health Services,
1–2.
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underfunded status of the NHS and the resultant inability to meet its demands. ‘These
[we]re particularly marked for many disabling and often painful conditions including
blindness, deafness and arthritis which [we]re not considered to pose an urgent threat to
life’, stressed Trident: A Tragedy for the Health Services. To put this point into perspective,
the booklet referred to a continual increase in patient numbers on waiting lists from
about 500,000 in 1975 to some 700,000 in 1983 in spite of protests by medical practi-
tioners and changes to the data collection that excluded day procedures from 1979.58
Together with its diagnosis of the state of the NHS, and in line with its preventative
medical approach, MCANW singled out six areas where strategic investment of funds
saved by abandoning Trident could effectively be used to improve conditions in the
health services. Apart from general practitioners in urban, especially inner city, areas with
high levels of unemployment, poverty and disadvantaged social groups, TNT campaign-
ing materials pointed out that care for the elderly was in desperate need of increased
funding. With population ageing likely to prompt major changes in Britain’s demographic
make-up over the next decade or so, the report stressed that these developments might
necessitate, for example, a 20 per cent increase in hospital beds alone over the next
10 years. Moreover, it viewed screening for cervical cancer as an important, yet severely
underfunded area within the NHS. The same applied to treatments of chronic renal fail-
ure on which the government spent some £60 million annually, which amounted to ‘less
than the cost of a single Trident missile’. Other fields in need of more funding were NHS
services dealing with drug addiction and medical research, especially the Medical
Research Council.59
While the campaigning angle on underfunded areas within the British health serv-
ices demonstrated MCANW’s broader programmatic remit as part of its evolution into
a multi-issue campaign, TNT also comprised a wider geographic focus on developing
nations. This shift in MCANW’s agenda reflected a growing public awareness of health
crises in developing nations. In 1981, the Overseas Development Administration, the
government department in charge of foreign aid, received numerous complaints by
members of the public who protested against cuts to the foreign aid budget, often
suggesting a re-allocation of funds from the defence to the foreign aid budget.60 As
for MCANW and TNT, IPPNW’s Fourth World Congress in 1984, which was attended
by representatives from MCANW and other national affiliates, laid some important
groundwork by addressing questions of military spending in relation to public health,
with special reference to developing nations.61 But it was the Ethiopian famine of
1984–85 that provided an immediate context for TNT; for it sensitised many Britons
and people around the world to the plight of Ethiopia and prompted a major humani-
tarian response through the Band Aid and Live Aid projects or NGOs such as Me´decins
sans Frontie`res and the British Disasters Emergency Committee, which comprised the
58Ibid., 2–3; Radical Statistics Health Group, ‘Unsafe in
Their Hands: Health Service Statistics for England’,
Radical Statistics, 1985, 33, 4–14; Radical Statistics
Nuclear Disarmament Group, The Nuclear Numbers
Game: Understanding the Statistics behind the
Bombs (London: Radical Statistics Group, 1982), 95.
59MCANW, Trident: A Tragedy for the Health Services,
4–6.
60Peter Broderick to F. H. Moberley, 23 December
1981, TNA, FCO 46/2696.
61‘IPPNW: 4th Congress Meets in Helsinki’, 1363.
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British Red Cross, the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development, Christian Aid, Oxfam
and Save the Children.62
TNT addressed ‘world health needs’ in a separate pamphlet in stark political language
(‘The cost of a 20 year programme to provide essential health and food needs for all
Third World countries is less than the worldwide yearly budget for nuclear weapons.’).
The leaflet alerted readers to the perils that malnutrition and infectious diseases, in partic-
ular malaria, trachoma and bilharzia, posed to people in the ‘Third World’. It even
claimed that some ‘150 people w[ould] have died needlessly in the poorer countries of
our world’ during the time required to read the pamphlet and suggested that, for the
majority of mankind, the concept of global health represented nothing more than ‘a
cruel joke’. In a similar vein, the leaflet connected MCANW’s original remit of nuclear dis-
armament with its new focus on developing nations by equating ‘[t]he number of chil-
dren dying of hunger and poverty . . . to the dropping of the Hiroshima bomb
somewhere in the Third world every two or three days’. MCANW regarded the inequal-
ities that many people in developing nations faced to be a direct result of Western prog-
ress since the days of nineteenth-century European colonialism. And both nuclear and
conventional armaments now exacerbated these inequalities.63
Like MAPW and other NGOs, MCANW cited the findings of the Brandt Report as justi-
fication for the urgent need to discuss ‘Third World’ development issues.64 The missive
was named after the former West German chancellor Willy Brandt, who directed the
North–South Commission that investigated the social and economic conditions in devel-
oping nations for the World Bank with support from the United Nations. It called on
Western countries to assist developing nations with the improvement of their agricultural
production, the provision of both clean water and essential health care to their popula-
tions as well as the elimination of diseases such as malaria and bilharzia.65
In line with Brandt’s proposals, TNT urged the Thatcher Government to increase its for-
eign aid budget from 0.35 per cent of the country’s gross national product to the levels
recommended by either the United Nations (0.7 per cent) or the Brandt Report (1 per
cent). Simultaneously, MCANW stressed the need for implementing nuclear and conven-
tional disarmament to set free funds that could then be used for providing inexpensive
yet effective measures to reduce infant mortality in developing nations. Amongst these
was the provision of growth charts to monitor children for early signs of malnutrition,
large-scale immunisation against tuberculosis, yellow fever and measles as well as diar-
rhoea treatment. Furthermore, TNT materials used the cost of a single fighter aircraft to
62Andrew Jones, ‘Band Aid Revisited:
Humanitarianism, Consumption and Philanthropy in
the 1980s’, Contemporary British History, 2017, 31,
189–209, 192; Jones, ‘The Disasters Emergency
Committee (DEC) and the Humanitarian Industry in
Britain, 1963–85’, Twentieth Century British History,
2015, 26, 573–601; Davey, ‘Famine, Aid, and
Ideology’.
63‘Trident or Health: World Health Needs’, n.d., unpa-
ginated, SA/MED/F/4/2.
64Ibid.; Hilton et al., The Politics of Expertise, 235;
MAPW, ‘Appeal for Phased World Disarmament,
Both Nuclear and Conventional’, The Lancet, 1980,
316, 739.
65Willy Brandt et al., North–South: A Programme for
Survival. Report of the International Commission on
International Development Issues (London: Pan,
1980); Lewer, Physicians and the Peace Movement,
82; Peter Merseburger, Willy Brandt, 1913–1992:
Visiona¨r und Realist (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 2002), 739–40.
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illustrate how those 20 million US dollars could alternatively be used to pay for some
‘40,000 village pharmacies’.66
Finally, an increasing professionalisation of campaigning methods and styles accompa-
nied MCANW’s evolution into a multi-issue campaign. Like other NGOs of the public
health and foreign aid sectors, MCANW optimised its use of campaigning materials and
interaction with the news media.67 Here, the group also sought advice from OXFAM.68
The creation of a Strategy Group in charge of identifying, planning and coordinating
campaigns, with John Launer at the helm, in the lead-up to TNT, marked one of the chief
steps in advancing the professionalisation of MCANW’s campaigning techniques.69
Besides targeting the news media and Members of Parliament (MPs) to generate public-
ity, some of the group’s chief actions constituted the establishment of more effective
communication with local branches to promote the campaign at the grass-roots level
and the re-wording of the campaign focus ‘from “cuts” to “needs”’ to convey a more
positive and readily documented message.70
Alongside mobilisation of members both at branch and national levels, these efforts
comprised collaboration with the Joint Parliamentary Committee, which the group oper-
ated with MAPW, as well as the production of some of the first campaign materials.71 To
prime members at the grass-roots level on effective ways of promoting the campaign, a
set of notes emphasised the importance of reaching out beyond medical professionals to
health workers. In addition, they offered practical guidance on how to liaise with other
relevant groups, raise funds, optimise internal communication, lobby local MPs, plan pub-
lic events effectively and make efficient use of key arguments against Trident. ‘Television
companies do not work at weekends or in the evenings unless you are Neil Kinnock or
Margaret Thatcher; so plan events inside working hours if you want to try for coverage’,
press officer Su Maddock instructed MCANW members pragmatically in these materi-
als.72 Apart from a second information pack, the Strategy Group supplied local branches
with a resources pack that contained, amongst other things, a TNT leaflet, car sticker and
pin badge, a list of relevant BMA and MCANW resolutions, sample publicity materials to
66‘Trident or Health: World Health Needs’.
67Berridge and Mold, ‘Professionalisation, New Social
Movements and Voluntary Action in the 1960s and
1970s’, 114–34; Jones, ‘The Disasters Emergency
Committee (DEC) and the Humanitarian Industry in
Britain’, 573–601.
68‘Minutes MCANW Executive Committee Meeting.
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5.
71‘Trident’, ‘Barrow Day of Action Against Trident’,
‘Trident Costs’, MCANW National Newsletter, 1985,
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show branches how they could produce campaigning materials relating to their local
areas and a sample letter to a local MP.73 And, as this preparation demonstrates,
MCANW had not only developed into a multi-issue campaign that issued more pro-
nounced political statements, but the group had also undergone a significant profession-
alisation process in its campaigning styles and methodology.
From ‘Treatment Not Trident’ to ‘Beds Not Bombs’
and the ‘Third World’
Almost immediately after the TNT launch, MCANW began with its assessment of and re-
flection on that campaign, including plans for taking it further. The Strategy Group was
satisfied with the launch event, particularly the ‘good press and media coverage’.74 The
latter drew considerable interest from general practitioners and hospital doctors.75 Its
popularity, together with the practice of distributing leaflets to patients via GPs and pho-
tocopying materials, forced the Executive Committee, by October 1985, to provide addi-
tional funds for the production of extra leaflets to meet the demand.76
Although MCANW’s new political mindedness made TNT more appealing to a public
audience, it prompted mixed responses from professional bodies, the clergy, anti-nuclear
weapons activists and local health authorities. While the BMA recognised ‘the need for
better funding in the National Health Service’, it did not actively support TNT in line with
its strict opposition to unilateralism. The Royal College of Nursing was more amenable to
the campaign, promoting it amongst its members. The British Council of Churches, in
principle, supported TNT, and the Bath Anti-Trident Action Group even ordered copies of
the campaign booklet.77 Local health authorities where many MCANW members were
employed did not always look too kindly to TNT’s overtly political message. Therefore,
some members’ employment status prevented them from promoting TNT in hospitals,
with some nurses even losing their jobs as a consequence of their open support of TNT.78
Nevertheless, MCANW decided to take TNT forward. And, from November 1985, fur-
ther plans started to shape up. Besides seizing the opportunity of using the award of the
Nobel Peace Prize to IPPNW in December 1985 as ‘a vehicle for publicising’ TNT,
MCANW sought to increase involvement at grass-roots level. In addition, the group en-
visaged a stronger engagement with nurses to strengthen the role of health workers
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within its ranks.79 Although by the end of its first year, the recruitment rate of new mem-
bers had quadrupled, with proportionally more health workers than medical professio-
nals now joining MCANW, medical professionals still dominated the group.80 MCANW,
thus, targeted all London nurses with a leaflet campaign to recruit more health workers.
These efforts came to fruition with a nurses’ TNT bus tour through England in May and
June 1986.81
By early 1986, plans for a continuation of TNT and a successor campaign were taking
on more concrete shape. The Strategy Group called on branches to support the cam-
paign by exploring possible links with health trade unions and the Labour Action for
Peace. In addition, the team produced a new TNT campaign poster that was later on dis-
play at over 60 sites across Britain. It showed patients queuing outside a hospital, along
with the anti-militarist line ‘For the cost of one Trident we could have a decent National
Health Service’ (Figure 2). While the Strategy Group envisaged the re-launched TNT cam-
paign to have a wider focus on global health issues, MCANW was also set to start a new
national campaign on the connections between health in developing nations and de-
fence spending in 1987.82
MCANW deliberately chose 23 September 1986 as the launch date of the TNT update
to mark the first anniversary of the original campaign start.83 A press release explained
the rationale behind MCANW’s decision to continue with TNT in modified form. Since
the launch of the original campaign a year earlier, it cautioned, ‘the cost of Trident ha[d]
risen by almost £600 million and the keel of the first submarine ha[d] already been laid
by Mrs Thatcher’. However, the NHS had faced ‘a shortfall of more than £6 million for ev-
ery health district in England and Wales’ during the same period—an assessment that
the British Medical Journal shared.84
The TNT update raised, by and large, similar issues as the original campaign and was
also aimed at increasing membership from health workers in the lead-up to an entirely
new national campaign to be launched in 1987.85 Yet, one major difference concerned
the emphasis that the update placed on unemployment as a chief root of infirmity and
poverty. This new angle was a response to the high unemployment figures that had
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remained above three million between 1982 and 1986, shifting public attention at times
away from nuclear arms.86 Here, TNT followed in the tradition of sociological and psy-
chological studies of the consequences of unemployment that had emerged during the
1930s world economic crisis.87 Curiously though, in the wake of the Chernobyl reactor
accident in the Soviet Union in April 1986, civilian nuclear energy did not feature pre-
dominantly in MCANW’s campaigning, let alone TNT.88
At the same time, MCANW’s message and rhetoric advanced even deeper into political
territory. A press release condemned ‘a lack of political will and investment’ for the ab-
sence of ‘fairness in the health field’, while the Thatcher Government spent vast sums on
Trident—‘a new and destructive weapon of genocide’.89 With its reference to nuclear
arms as genocidal weapons, TNT touched on emerging discourses over human rights and
the illegality of nuclear weaponry. While Oxfam started to apply a human rights discourse
to questions of development in the ‘Third World’, the contributory expert group Lawyers
Figure 2: Nurses with ‘Treatment Not Trident’ re-launch campaign poster. Photograph from the Medact
Archive. Wellcome Images reference: L0075324.
86Ibid., 2–3. MCANW, Trident or Health? Treatment
not Trident Campaign Update, 1, 2, 10–11, 13, 15;
Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain, 125.
87E. W. Bakke, The Unemployed Man: A Social Study
(London: Nisbet, 1933); G. D. H. Cole and M. I. Cole,
The Condition of Britain (London: Gollancz, 1937); P.
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1938, 35, 358–90.
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for Nuclear Disarmament called for nuclear arms to be outlawed.90 In this context,
MCANW labelled the decision to purchase Trident ‘irrational and immoral’ and warned
that the government’s funding priorities might create a scenario where ‘our scale of val-
ues [wa]s no longer worth defending’.91 And this marked a strong politicisation—not
only by MCANW’s standards.
The accompanying booklet echoed this political tone and offered, in the words of
MCANW’s new press officer Gillian Reeve, ‘a chilling update’.92 With 25 pages, it was al-
most three times as long as Trident: A Tragedy for the Health Services, thus giving
MCANW considerably more space to explain its content and argument. The new booklet
was referenced throughout and contained an additional section on Trident in relation to
several (often quite political) issues. Besides moral-ethical quandaries about Trident’s le-
gitimacy (‘an insult to morality’) and consideration of its role in international security and
relations in terms of ‘an obstruction to the progress of arms control’, the booklet shed
critical light on technical features of Trident, in particular its alleged technological depen-
dence on the United States military.93
The great uncertainty surrounding the exact cost of that weapon system remained a
source of concern for MCANW. After all, the Trident decision had already resulted in a
dramatic increase in Britain’s defence budget to £18.2 billion (a higher proportion of the
national income than in any other NATO member state except for the United States)
compared to £16.7 billion spent on health care. In addition, the report questioned the
Thatcher Government’s claim that the acquisition of the Trident system would create
more jobs, especially in shipyards in Barrow-in-Furness, Cumbria, that built the Vanguard
class carrier submarines. MCANW estimated that approximately 50 per cent of Trident-
related jobs would be created in the United States. Given the high cost of that weapon
system, MCANW—like many anti-nuclear weapons campaigners—followed a ‘defencist’
line, arguing that Trident ‘pushed out conventional projects’ in the British defence indus-
try and hence jeopardised jobs.94
Finally, the TNT update criticised the secretive and un-democratic nature of decision
making about the purchase of Trident that largely took place outside parliamentary con-
trol.95 Here, MCANW echoed a contemporary political concern. Segments of the media
and CND condemned the British government for focusing almost exclusively on political
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elites in its civil defence plans and plotting the introduction of quasi dictatorial powers to
control the general population in the aftermath of a nuclear attack.96
By November 1986, MCANW started to assess the impact of the TNT re-launch. John
Launer pointed to two major achievements: higher coherence within MCANW as a cen-
trally ‘co-ordinated campaigning organisation’ with a diversified agenda and its capability
to identify topical issues. Or, as he euphemistically put it: ‘What MCANW is saying today,
Britain will be talking about tomorrow!’ Launer remained realistic though about the im-
pact that TNT might have on British politics; he viewed MCANW and its anti-Trident cam-
paign as facilitators who brought the issues of defence versus health expenditure to the
attention of the British public.97
MCANW’s diversifying agenda in the TNT update epitomised the group’s continued
transformation into a multi-issue campaign. If the Strategy Group had focused almost ex-
clusively on Trident as the main focus during the preparation of the original TNT cam-
paign, the team was now more open towards other (often IPPNW-related) matters for
‘longer term’ planning.98 Consequently, the Strategy Group discussed ideas for a new
national campaign ahead of the TNT re-launch. While there was agreement that
MCANW should continue with its recruitment of health professionals, some team mem-
bers worried the group had lost its programmatic orientation, as they regarded the orga-
nisation as ‘a nuclear disarmament campaign, not a health cuts campaign’. And this
demonstrated the persistence of internal struggles over MCANW’s mission, just as John
Launer had appealed to members ahead of the original TNT launch in 1985 to ‘[u]se that
debate to decide what . . . [their] group want[ed] to say . . ., not just argue with each
other’. Eventually, consensus emerged on a new campaign on nuclear arms and health
concerns in developing nations.99 This new campaign built on existing IPPNW contacts in
developing nations and was intended to forge partnerships between MCANW branches
and local health services in ‘Third World’ nations.100
As early as December 1985, the Strategy Group had already devised a policy paper
that urged MCANW to review its general strategy and outlined three future campaigning
foci: alongside government expenditure on defence versus health in Britain and develop-
ing nations, the document proposed that the group should compare the government
budget allocations for arms and medical research and discuss United States President
Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (‘Star Wars’).101 These proposals led to the
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development of two new campaigns alongside TNT: ‘Beds not Bombs’ (BNB) and the
‘Third World Campaign’ (TWC). With its focus on ‘local experience of cuts in health serv-
ices’, TNT not only served as a blue print for BNB, but the latter campaign represented, in
many ways, also a continuation of TNT, albeit with a different focus. With a London
launch date set for February 1987, the Strategy Group envisaged BNB to tie in with a
chief recruitment drive.102
From January 1987, plans for TWC took shape. Through TWC, the Strategy Group
intended to establish connections between the issues of development and arms reduc-
tion by pairing MCANW branches with similar groups in the ‘Third World’ and exchang-
ing relevant data between these twinned groups.103 Domestic public health care
provision and health concerns in developing nations also translated into MCANW’s ‘Even
Before the Bomb Drops’ information pack and exhibition.104 At the same time, MCANW
showed growing concern over human rights, especially in the wake of a military coup in
Fiji and attempts by the Turkish authorities to suppress the formation of an IPPNW affili-
ate in that country.105 While these developments were powerful indicators of MCANW’s
ongoing programmatic diversification, it was at IPPNW’s 1987 World Congress in
Moscow, which representatives from MCANW and other national affiliates attended,
that the international umbrella organisation formally recognised its (and MCANW’s) new
status as a multi-issue campaign.106
Conclusions
Taking place in 1985–86, when tensions between the superpowers relaxed, and combin-
ing MCANW’s original aim of nuclear disarmament with wider issues of health inequality
and anti-militarism at home and in developing nations, TNT marked an important mo-
ment in the development of MCANW and medical activism more widely. Above all, it
demonstrated the extension of the group’s campaigning focus to cover a broader remit
both programmatically (beyond nuclear-weapons-related matters) and geographically
(beyond Britain and other Western nations in the Global North). This shift was significant
for MCANW and anti-nuclear politics more generally, for this strategic mobilisation of na-
tional and global health and welfare priorities made the group’s activism relevant to a
larger target audience. At the same time, this new emphasis revealed similarities between
MCANW and the evolution of other British NGOs from single- into multi-issue campaigns
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during the mid-1980s. With its anti-militarist critique of the Thatcher Government’s pri-
oritisation of military over health spending, MCANW also took a more politicised ap-
proach to campaigning than ever before. Moreover, TNT also displayed a greater level of
professionalisation of the group’s approaches and methods as well as inclusivity towards
health workers, especially nurses.
While it is impossible to gauge the exact impact that TNT had on Britons’ beliefs about
nuclear weapons and health inequality at home and in developing nations, some obser-
vations about the original campaign and its update, especially their arguments and rhe-
toric, can be made. Above all, legitimate questions remain about the feasibility of
MCANW’s proposals for the cancellation of the Trident system and the subsequent re-
allocation of those funds to the NHS and foreign aid budgets, as such a breach of con-
tract would most likely result in legal charges and fines from the manufacturers of the
weapon system. Perhaps, TNT’s central line should then not be taken at face value but
rather as a means to raise public awareness about the cost of nuclear weapons and the
state of the NHS at a time of economic and social depravation; for the welfare state
came to represent such a pivotal British institution that virtually touched upon every
Briton’s life after the end of the Second World War. This was also visible during Vote
Leave’s campaign ahead of the 2016 referendum over Britain’s membership of the
European Union (EU) where the group claimed that the sum of £350 million per week
could be spent on the NHS instead of paying it to the EU, if Britain left that organisation.
Shortly after the referendum, however, Vote Leave quietly abandoned this pledge: not
only did the figure of £350 million not add up, but its proposal for a simple re-allocation
of Britain’s EU payments to the NHS proved unfeasible.107
Apart from relying on the state of the NHS to illustrate health inequality, TNT had sev-
eral internal and external impacts. Externally, the articulation of more pronounced politi-
cal statements certainly made MCANW appear more coherent and convincing in public.
Yet, unlike CND, it remained an organisation of medical activists based on its members’
‘contributory expertise’ that avoided closer ties with groups of the anti-nuclear weapons
mass movement. Internally, TNT inspired other working groups within MCANW to take
more political stances.108 Although the campaign helped MCANW to recruit more mem-
bers and increase the group’s inclusivity through greater numbers of health workers join-
ing the organisation, there remained a sense of exclusivity of medical professionals,
particularly amongst nurses organised in MCANW. Some nurses and other health work-
ers even felt that MCANW’s power structure mirrored similar hierarchies present in the
NHS.109
MCANW continued to embrace issues outside its traditional remit of nuclear disarma-
ment, and, in 1992, in a most pragmatic move, the group merged with its sister organisa-
tion MAPW to form the multi-issue campaign Medical Action for Global Security
(MEDACT). While the new organisation continued to push for increased government
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expenditure on health care worldwide (at the expense of national defence budgets) and
a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, it had a much more diverse agenda than
MCANW. Not only did MEDACT look into civilian nuclear energy and its health and envi-
ronmental impacts, but it expanded its remit even beyond nuclear matters into four main
areas: ‘Peace and Justice’, ‘Climate and Environment’, ‘Economic Justice’ and ‘Human
Rights’.110
Some 30 years after the original TNT launch, at a time when the House of Commons
voted in favour of the Trident replacement programme and the NHS was in a critical
state, the campaign’s central anti-militarist argument about the proportionality between
government spending on defence versus health care was back on the political agenda.
MEDACT condemned the plans to replace Trident and participated in a large anti-Trident
rally in London. At the same time, CND followed a similar anti-militarist argument as pro-
posed by MCANW in TNT, making ‘the economic case against Trident’. This included a
diversion of funds from that weapons programme to the NHS. Yet, 30 years on, TNT
appeared to have been forgotten, and the campaigning by medical professionals, health
workers and anti-nuclear weapons activists failed to reach the same intensity and vigour
as in the mid-1980s.111 Nevertheless, an analysis of TNT offers crucial insight into major
features of the history, nature and ideologies of medical activism concerning health in-
equality and anti-militarism in 1980s Britain and beyond.
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